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Abstract
We construct a model of dynamic endogenous product innovation and international trade, using it to
calculate the welfare eﬀects of lower intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the non-innovating
South than in the innovating North. We find that it is generally in the North’s interest to protect its
innovating sector by an import embargo on IPR-oﬀending goods from abroad. We explain the paradoxical
outcome where the North gains from weaker IPR enforcement in the South through a decomposition of
the dynamic welfare formula. Key features include the ability of lower Southern IPR protection to spur
innovation of Northern goods and to make available greater resources for Northern production of current
consumption goods. Maintaining Northern IPR standards can be in the South’s interests even though
the South would favor lower uniform levels of IPR protection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement presents a classic incentive problem. Social interest dictates
that an innovated product should be available at as low a price as possible. Yet allowing all producers
immediate access to innovated technology reduces the market power and profits of the innovator, leaving no
incentive for innovation in the future. Price advantages today, therefore must be balanced against innovation
tomorrow.
The problem is particularly troublesome when the innovation takes place in one country and consumers of
the product reside in another. In this case there are two entities and two jurisdictions where the intellectual
property rights can be enforced. If both regions equally enforce intellectual property rights one regime
obtains. If they enforce intellectual property rights in an unequal or asymmetric fashion, however, another
regime obtains. Typically, the situation of greatest interest is when one region, call this the innovating North,
enforces a higher standard of intellectual property rights protection than does the partner trading region,
the non-innovating South.
What advantage can there be for the South, which does not innovate and must pay higher prices for
imported goods still under patient in the North, to favor the same standards of intellectual property rights
protection as in North when its own firms can produce copied (pirated) products at much lower prices
than they can import them? In a pathbreaking treatment of intellectual property rights, Helpman (1993)
constructs a dynamic model of market-determined product innovation based on Grossman and Helpman
(1991a, 1991b). Assuming symmetric IPR enforcement by the North and South, he finds that whether the
rate of imitation (piracy) is currently high or currently low in steady state, it is never in the South’s economic
interest to increase the rate of intellectual property rights protection. From careful inspection of his dynamic
model Helpman concludes, “My analysis suggests that if anyone benefits [from tighter intellectual property
rights protection], it is not the South. The answer is robust with respect to all of the variations that I have
examined.”
This unambiguous conclusion is both powerful and provocative, especially as the World Trade Organi-
zation places more eﬀective standards of intellectual property rights protection high on its list of objectives.
The main argument advanced by innovating countries has been that by enforcing a uniform, high standard
of intellectual property rights the South aids in the encouragement of innovation in products used by the
South. The South thereby reaps the long run benefits of more and newer goods. Helpman’s analysis termi-
nates or at least greatly restricts this line of discussion. The Grossman-Helpman approach, building on the
seminal paper by Krugman (1979), depends on very few standard assumptions about innovation and market
structure, and thus is attractive for further examining these issues. For example, if the South is unable to
induce the rest of the world to joint it in lower IPR protection, should it reduce its standard unilaterally?
Or phrased diﬀerently, if the innovating region of the world enforces one standard of IPR protection does
the South gain from enforcing IPR protection to match the same standard? This paper investigates the case
for Southern intellectual property rights enforcement in case of designed-to-market goods.
The attention of economists to intellectual property rights and to the specific issue of the geographical
extension of IPR protection is growing.1 Deardorﬀ (1991), in a perceptive and insightful analysis of geograph-
ical extension of intellectual property rights suggests that diminishing returns to the eﬀect that extending
protection to larger and larger regions of the world has on innovation means that the costs of protection will
exceed benefits before protection has been extended fully. Interests of innovating and non-innovating regions
are opposed with respect to extending IPR protection to the non-innovating region. Chin and Grossman
(1990) examine a Cournot duopoly where innovation takes the form of lower production costs for a com-
mon good. Under certain conditions the South can benefit from granting IPR protection when the country
“stands to gain much on the consumption side from the fruits of the Northern firm’s research eﬀorts,” a
conclusion that Diwan and Rodrick (1991) reach from a diﬀerent direction in an interesting static model
that emphasizes the eﬀect that diﬀerent distributions of tastes for goods between regions has on innovated
goods mix and its utility to diﬀerent regions.
A careful review of the intellectual property rights debate shows that many of the positions taken by
innovating countries derive from innovating industries, some of which find themselves in a position similar
to the American pharmaceutical industry. In pharmaceuticals it is not uncommon to develop drugs that are
specific to diseases prevalent in a particular region of the world. Research into a Southern-occurring tropical
disease, for example, may be less important for Northern regions than it is for many tropical countries. A
Southern market that does not enforce intellectual property rights may find Northern resources redirected
to innovation in products that are only marketed in Northern regions. Laxer enforcement of intellectual
property rights in the South compared to the North therefore leads to less innovation of goods important to
the South, but continuing innovation for goods important to the North. In the short run, the South might
gain by its failure to enforce intellectual property rights due to lower prices for products it buys, but lose in
the long run due to a smaller range of innovated goods from which to choose.
Growing empirical work on intellectual property rights tends to confirm intuition. Mansfield, Schwartz,
and Wagner (1981), for example, empirically estimated the relative cost of imitation versus the cost of
1Mansfield (1986) and Farrantino (1993) relate intellectual property rights protection to increased innovation and foreign
direct investment while Gould and Gruben (1996), Park (1993) and Park and Ginarte (1997) document a positive association
between IPR and growth. Park and Ginarte find that the connection is indirect, however, through the inducement to accumulate
factor inputs such as R&D capital. The innovating country,or a country with an innovating sector, therefore tends to benefit in
contrast to the country without one. Taylor (1993, 1994) investigates cost-reducing technological innovation and the eﬀect of
diﬀerential IPR protection on the transfer of technology abroad. Here we consider only innovation of the goods-creating variety.
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innovation, finding considerable variation over the industries examined, but, as expected, significantly lower
cost to imitation. As a deterrence matter, stronger patent protection does not make entry impossible, but
it does increase imitation costs. About half of products examined would not have been introduced without
patent production. Feinberg and Rousslag (1990) document the harm done by infringed products, finding
that profit looses of suppliers of copied goods are significant and exceed the profits gained by the infringers.
Goods which the South imitates in violation of Northern patents are often sold in Northern markets as
export goods. Northern innovators find themselves competing with imported copies of their own products,
lessening their ability to recoup their innovation outlays. The Northern response to such imports is frequently
to ban the importation of goods that violate domestic patents or copyrights. Diﬀerentially lax enforcement
of intellectual property rights in the South therefore can inhibit Northern innovation, have eﬀects on trade,
or both. While the remedy in trade law for the innovating country is to embargo infringing goods, it remains
to be shown if this is necessarily welfare-enhancing to the North, even when it protects the viability of the
North’s innovating sector.
Asymmetric property rights enforcement fundamentally has to do with market-determined product in-
novation in a dynamic general equilibrium context. Thus, this paper constructs a dynamic model containing
these elements of the Grossman-Helpman-Krugman type to portray the case of interest where goods con-
sumed in the South are diﬀerentiated from goods that are consumed in the North. Innovation in Northern
and Southern goods occurs in the North. The South may copy goods of either type. When the South copies
goods diﬀerentiated for its own market, it sells them only in the South ( for example, if the South imitates
the pharmaceutical developed for its tropical market only, it sells the copied drug domestically), whereas
when it copies goods diﬀerentiated for the North, it sells them in the North.
If the intellectual property rights are symmetrically enforced, we show that the model is isometric to
the Helpman (1993) model and exhibits the same dynamics. When the South drops its enforcement of
intellectual property rights, however, this results in a regime change where innovation of Southern goods
stops altogether. The South therefore benefits from price reduction for goods formerly under patent and
purchased from the North, but it experiences an eventual long run loss due to a slower-growing range of goods
in the future ( in this case zero-growing) from which to choose. If the South does not innovate (a maintained
hypothesis if the Grossman-Helpman-Krugman analysis and the present model), it is permanently relegated
to consuming the goods that were available to it at the time of the regime switch. Further, with Section
337-type restrictions in place in the North, the North does not import copies of Northern products that were
under patent at the time of the regime change. This adversely aﬀects trade between the two regions with
the result that both regions, but especially the South, are harmed by Southern failure to enforce intellectual
property rights.
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After the regime change the inability of the North to profitably innovate for Southern markets means
that the Northern sector devoted to innovating Southern products shrinks. The immediate impact of this on
Northern welfare is to free resources for production of consumables and therefore raise welfare. It also acts
as a source of resources to devote to innovation of Northern goods. As time passes, however , the loss of the
Southern market for sales of innovated products means that a relatively smaller target market is available
for Northern innovators. We show that the net eﬀect of the competing forces – increased resources available
for Northern innovation, but less motivation for using them – can result either in increased or decreased
innovation rate in the North. Paradoxically, in the long run, the North may gain by the failure of the South
to provide intellectually property rights protection equal to its own.
Another notable outcome of the present investigation is that it is possible for the South to harm itself
by unilateral lax enforcement of intellectually property rights, or, what is the same thing, to help itself
by adopting standards of IPR protection enforced in the rest of the world. Mitigating factors include the
potentially greater incentive for the start of Southern innovation upon the regime switch, the eﬀects of
learning by doing, conditions under which innovation by the North for Southern products will continue little
abated with imperfect intellectual property rights enforcement in the South and so on. We return to some of
these related issues in our concluding remarks after presenting the main line of analysis. Section 2 presents
the elements of the model. Section 3 discusses the model in the regime of symmetric IPR enforcement.
Section 4 re-solves the model in the regime of asymmetric IPR enforcement and derives the welfare changes
implied by the regime switch for the North and for the South.
2 THE MODEL
In this section we describe dynamics of product innovation, North- South trade, and intertemporal welfare.
2.1 Product Innovation, Market Power, and Trade
Start by assuming that there is a continuum of goods available, identified by number from zero to an upper
bound that grows over time with innovation. Goods are designed-to-market for consumption in each of
two country locations. For example, we imagine clothing or pharmaceuticals developed for the South being
specific to the climate and diseases prevailing in that region. Goods x, ranging from 0 to nx, are consumed
by the North, and goods y, ranging from 0 to ny, are consumed by the South.
Innovation takes place in both x and y. New products of each type are introduced at the rates gx and
gy in the innovating North, where they are initially produced under conditions of monopolistic competition.
The South imitates Northern-produced products at the rate mx and my. Once a good is imitated we assume
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that the technology becomes commonly known, and the market structure for those goods becomes perfectly
competitive. We will sometimes refer to unimitated goods as “under-patent” and imitated goods produced
perfectly competitively as “out-of-patent.”
The availability of goods and their prices, p(i) and q(j), can be represented in terms of Figure 1 which
linearly arranges goods x and y by pointing them to the right from a common origin. Goods consumed in
the North have market prices p; goods consumed in the South have market prices q. Superscript S indicates
prices for imitated (out-of-patent) goods;2 Superscript N indicates prices for unimitated (under-patent)
goods.3 The numbers of goods x and y are given by the length of each line from the origin and ζx and
ζy respectively, are the fractions of x and y type goods that are currently under patent. The numbers of
out-of-patent goods imitated by the South are given by (1− ζx)nxand(1− ζy)ny, respectively.
Utility in each region is given by
U(t) =
ˆ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) log u(τ)dτ (1)
where ρ is the subjective discount rate and log u(t) is the flow of utility at time τ . The flow of utility depends
on the flow of consumption
uN (τ) =
￿ˆ nx
0
cx(i)
ε−1
ε di
￿ ε
ε−1
(2)
uS(τ) =
￿ˆ ny
0
cy(j)
ε−1
ε dj
￿ ε
ε−1
, ε > 1
where preferences take the CES form over the continuum of available goods. The resulting demand functions
are
cx(i) =
1
p(i)
￿
p(i)
P
￿1−ε
EN
(3)
cy(j) =
1
q(j)
￿
q(j)
Q
￿1−ε
ES
where EN and ES are aggregate spending on consumer goods in the North and South, respectively, and
2These are produced in the South in the regime of symmetric IPR protection, though in the regime of asymmetric IPR
protection the North will also produce out-of-patent goods.
3These are produced exclusively in the North in the regime of symmetric IPR protection, though in the regime of asymmetric
IPR protection the South will produce imitation of formerly under-patent Products.
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Figure 1: NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN GOODS
the price indexes P and Q are given by
P =
￿ˆ nx
0
p(i)1−εdi
￿ 1
1−ε
=
￿ˆ (1−ζx)nx
0
(pS)1−εdi+
ˆ nx
(1−ζx)nx
(pN )1−εdi
￿ 1
1−￿
= n
1
1−ε
x
￿
(1− ζx)
￿
pS
￿1−ε + ζx ￿pN￿1−ε￿ 11−ε
(4)
Q = n
1
1−ε
y
￿
(1− ζy)
￿
qS
￿1−ε + ζy ￿qN￿1−ε￿ 11−ε
Substituting (3) and (4) into (2) gives the indirect utility functions
log uN = log EN − log P
(5)
log uS = log ES − log Q
In deriving (4) we used the model property that prices for goods produced in the North equal pN and those
produced in the South equal pS , where
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pN (i) = pN = qN = qN (j) > pS(i) = pS = qS = qS(j) (6)
Equation (6) follows from the assumption that goods are manufactured with one unit of labor per unit
of output. A manufacturer having invented a product in the North can charge a monopoly price as long as
the product remains unimitated by other firms. Once a product is imitated (out-of-patent), its technology
becomes known to all producers and its price is determined by perfect competition. The demand functions
above and the supply conditions just described imply that the equilibrium monopoly and competitive prices,
respectively, satisfy4
pN0 =
￿
ε
ε− 1
￿
wN0 > w
N
0 > w
S
0 = pS0 (7)
where wN , equal to the manufacturer’s marginal cost, is the Northern wage and wS is the marginal cost
of production in the lower-wage South. We will use subscript 0 to refer to equilibrium prices in the initial
equilibrium to distinguish them from equilibrium prices in another equilibrium after a regime switch. Since
the North charges a markup over marginal cost for under-patent goods, the positive profits from producing
under-patent goods in the North exceed the profits that would be earned from producing imitated (out-of-
patent) goods. It follows that the South produces only imitated good x and y and the North produces only
unimitated goods x and y. Common technology thus implies that pN = qN and pS = qSas in equation (6).
2.2 Endogenous Innovation
An important contribution of Helpman and Grossman (see Helpman and Grossman (1991) or Helpman
(1993) ) was their description of the market forces endogenizing the innovation rate of new products. We
follow their lead to endogenize the rate of innovation. Assume the innovation requires labor input H to
produce HK/a = n˙ new products per unit time where H represents labor hours employed in innovation, K
is the cumulative stock of knowledge (here K = nx or K = ny) and a is a productivity parameter. This
implies that gk = Hk/a, k = x, y so that the resource constraint for the North becomes
4We assume that the economy satisfies the feasibility condition
g >
1
2a
￿
LN −
￿
ε− 1
ε
￿ε
LS
ζ
1− ζ
￿
which implies wN > wS . See equations (7) and (13).
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axgx +
ˆ ζxnx
0
xN (i)di+ aygy +
ˆ ζyny
0
yN (j)dj = LN , or
(8)
axgx +
ˆ ζxnx
0
cx(i)di+ aygy +
ˆ ζyny
0
cy(j)dj = LN
where xN (i), yN (j) are the quantity of goods x(i) and y(j) produced by the North, and LN is the Northern
labor supply.
The market value of a product-innovating firm vN must cover the development costs, or innovation will
be unprofitable. It cannot more than cover costs or demand for labor in the innovation sector would become
unbounded. Thus vNHknk/a− wNHk = 0 or
vN = w
Na
n
(9)
Assuming well functioning capital markets, the return to a firm if it continues operations is
πNdt+ (1−mdt) v˙Ndt−mvNdt
where πN is the profit earned by the firm over the instant dt, v˙Ndt is the capital gain to the firm (change
in market value) if the firm is not imitated during the instant) the probability of being imitated is mdt) less
the loss in firm value if the firm is imitated. Against this return, the firm could sell its shares and earn
rNvNdt
over the instant dt where rN is the Northern nominal interest rate. Dividing both terms by dt, and taking
the limit as dt approaches zero, equilibrium requires that rNvN = πN + v˙N −mvN or
rN = π
N
vN
+ v˙
N
vN
−m (10)
Expenditures by a Northern consumer with preferences given by (1) satisfy
E˙N
EN
= rN − ρ (11)
Using the resource constraint for the Northern labor and demands (3) and (4) with the expression EN =
pN (LN − axgx− aygy) allows one to generate an expression for E˙N and solve the model for the dynamics of
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gx and gy.
We turn first to the solution of the model for innovation rates, terms of trade, and welfare in the case
where North and South equally enforce intellectually property rights. We then re-solve the model to compare
this to the asymmetric alternative where the North enforces intellectual property rights but the South does
not.
2.3 Symmetric IPR Protection and Growth
In this section we impose simplifying symmetry assumptions. Under these assumptions we show that the
model replicates that of Helpman (1993).
Now make the symmetry assumption ζx = ζy = ζ and nx = ny = n. We have from (4) that P = Q .
From the Northern labor constraint (8) and demands (3), we have
LN = 2ag + 1
pN
ˆ ζn
0
pNcx(i)di+
1
qN
ˆ ζn
0
qNcy(j)dj
= 2ag + 1
pN
￿
ζn
￿
pN
P
￿1−ε
EN
￿
+ 1
qN
￿
ζn
￿
qN
Q
￿1−ε
ES
￿
= 2ag + 1
pN
nζ
￿
pN
P
￿1−ε ￿
EN + ES
￿
or
pN
￿
LN − 2ag￿ = nζ ￿pN
P
￿1−ε ￿
pN (LN − 2ag) + pSLS￿ (12)
Thus, using (4) and (12) to solve for p
N
pS gives
pN
pS
=
￿
ζ
1− ζ ·
LS
LN − 2ag
￿1/ε
(13)
as in Helpman (1993).
This equation underscores the fact that northern terms of trade (and hence income) improve as the share
of unimitated goods grows larger. Correspondingly, southern welfare improves with greater imitation (more
lax IPR enforcement on a symmetric basis between North and South means lower ζ). We examine the eﬀect
of more lax IPR enforcement in the South after describing worker welfare for both countries.
On a per worker basis utility is
9
log uN = log E
N
LN
− log P = 1
ε− 1
￿
log nx + log
￿
ζx + (1− ζx)
￿
pN
pS
￿ε−1￿￿
(14)
log uS = log E
S
LS
− log Q = 1
ε− 1
￿
log ny + log
￿
ζy
￿
pS
pN
￿ε−1
+ (1− ζy)
￿￿
where LN and LS are the labor supplies in the North and South, respectively. With ζx = ζy = ζ and
nx = ny = n , (14) reduces to Helpman’s (1993) equations (15) and (16).
To solve for the model dynamics, diﬀerentiate the identity EN = pN (LN − 2ag) to get
E˙N
EN
= p˙
N
pN
− 2ag˙
LN − 2ag (15)
Combining (15) with (11) gives
rN = ρ+ p˙
N
pN
− 2ag˙
LN − 2ag (16)
From 2ag + 2nζxN = LN , πN = (1− α) pNxNwhere α ≡ ε−1ε and (9)
πN
vN
= 1− α
α
￿
LN
2a − g
￿ 1
ζ
(17)
Thus, (10), (16), (17), w˙NwN =
p˙N
pN and
v˙N
vN =
w˙N
wN − g (see (9)) imply
g˙ =
￿
LN
2a − g
￿￿
ρ+m+ g − 1− α
α
￿
LN
2a − g
￿ 1
ζ
￿
(18)
Using the definition m = n˙SnN where nS = (1− ζ)n, nN = ζn gives
ζ˙ = g − (g +m) ζ (19)
The autonomous system (18) and (19) agrees with system (24) and (25) of Helpman (1993).
3 PROPERTY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT ANDGROWTH: THE
SYMMETRIC CASE
Section 2 described the dynamics of product innovation, North-South trade, and intertemporal welfare.
Under the symmetry assumptions imposed where North and South equally enforce intellectual property
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rights we showed that the model reduces to the model of Helpman (1993). The analysis of Helpman therefore
applies in the present case.
The two significant conclusions arising from the autonomous system (18) and (19) are contained in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Helpman):5 For economies that begin in steady state, the South gains from weaker intellec-
tual property rights enforcement (higher m). The North also gains from weaker intellectual property rights
if the rate of imitation is suﬃciently small.
The implications of Theorem 1 are significant for international negotiations about the level of intellectual
property rights protection because they imply that it is in the interest of a non-innovating country always
to press for weaker IPR protection. Innovating countries, in contrast, must seek to optimize the value of
protection. Their worries derive from the possibility of choosing such overly-high protection that the losses
from monopoly power granted outweigh the gains from greater induced innovation.
The South favors lower worldwide IPR standards. What are its interests if the rest of the world does not
join it in lower IPR protection? In view of their diﬀerent regional interests, the next section considers the
asymmetric case where the South drops its intellectual property rights protection and the North does not.
4 PROPERTY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT ANDGROWTH: THE
SYMMETRIC CASE
We now drop the symmetry assumptions ζx = ζy = ζ and nx = ny = n and re-solve the model to find the
eﬀects on both regions of asymmetric intellectual property rights enforcement. In the asymmetric regime
the North enforces IPR but the South does not. We consider two possibilities. In the first case, we assume
that the North imposes a ban on the importation of newly copied x goods, while remaining open to the
importation of x goods that were already imitated ( out of patent) at the time of the regime switch. An
import embargo is the conventional remedy in law against foreign products found to violate domestic firms’
intellectual property rights. In the United States this is the standard remedy applied by Section 337 of the
trade regulations, for example.
We also consider a second case where the North does not impose an embargo, but remains open to
imports of all goods from South. We examine the eﬀect on the Northern welfare in both open to imports
of all goods from the South. We examine the eﬀect on Northern welfare in both alternatives. We find that
the loss of intellectual property rights protection generally harms the North either way, but that Northern
5See Theorems 1 and 2 of Helpman (1993)
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welfare is higher if it imposes an embargo than if it does not. An embargo on imports of newly copied
products, therefore, is a sensible strategy for the North.
4.1 The Eﬀect of Asymmetric IPR Enforcement on Trade
We consider the embargo and no-embargo cases in turn.
4.1.1 Asymmetric IPR Enforcement: Embargo Case
In the absence of Southern protection for Northern intellectual property
my = 1 > mx ≥ 0
Southern producers imitate y-type products as soon as they are invented in the North and the number of y-
type products produced in the South equals the full range of these products available. Northern producers of
y goods therefore lose monopoly power at the point of the regime switch. With Northern refusal to import
x goods that are newly copied by the South, however, Northern producers of non-imitated goods x still
charge a monopoly price pN . Continuation of trade in the new regime therefore implies wage equalization
wS = wN .6 Thus
qN1 = qS1 = pS1 = wS1 = wN1 <
￿
ε
ε− 1
￿
wN1 = pN1 (20)
where subscript 1 denotes equilibrium prices in the regime of asymmetric intellectual property rights enforce-
ment to distinguish them from equilibrium prices with subscript 0 in the initial regime. South producers
export out-of-patent x goods to the North in return for imports of an equal value of y goods from the North.
This new equilibrium has two special features that deserve mention.
First, Northern producers continue to innovate x goods and to produce them at the monopoly price pN .
The range of Northern goods, therefore, continues to grow. However, the range of Southern goods are frozen
at the regime-switch level due to the cessation of Northern innovation in y goods (such innovated products
would be immediately copied in the South).
Second, although trade continues after the regime switch, it has no welfare consequences. That is,
Northern imports of x goods from the South are paid for by Northern exports of y goods. But, were the North
to produce domestically its imported x goods, it could do so at the same prices using the labor it employs
to produce its y-good exports. A similar statement applies for the South. The world is welfare-equivalent to
6If wS < wN , Southern producers would produce y goods and out-of-patent x goods at prices below Northern producer
prices. The North could not export y goods to pay for its imports. If wS > wN Northern producers would produce y goods and
out-of-patent x goods at prices below Southern producer prices. The South could not export x goods to pay for its imports.
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two autarkic economies, therefore, with the static South producing y goods for local consumption and the
innovating North producing x goods for local consumption.
4.1.2 Asymmetric IPR Enforcement : No Embargo Case
The preceding description applies when the South drops IPR protection and the North responds by refusing
to import goods that were under Northern patent at the time of the regime switch. As noted, this agrees
with the usual remedy applied by innovating countries when a foreign nation denies intellectual property
rights protection for their products. Were the North to allow unrestricted imports of any good, all Northern
innovation would cease because any innovated good would be immediately copied by the South to undersell
the Northern innovator.
Trade between North and South would still be possible, consisting of x goods sold to the North in return
for y goods sold to the South, but all goods in both regions would be produced perfectly competitively. If
not, Southern firms would imitate and undersell the product. Wages would be equalized between North and
South because productive technology is the same between regions. Identical technology between North and
South would also mean that the welfare of each country would be the same as if there were no trade between
areas and both regions produced all of their own goods.
Comparing the consequences of no embargo to the embargo case, therefore, we find that the primary
diﬀerence is that without embargo the North looses the viability of its innovation sector. We will use this
fact when we compute Northern welfare. In the next section we return to the embargo case to examine the
eﬀect of the regime switch on Northern innovation dynamics.
4.2 The Eﬀects of Asymmetric IPR Enforcement on Innovation: Embargo Case
In the presence of a Northern embargo Northern producers continue to innovate x goods, but cease to
innovate y-type products after the regime switch. Resources used to innovate y goods are redirected. This
redirection alters the innovation and growth rates applying to x-type goods. To derive the dynamic equation
system for the regime of asymmetric IPR enforcement we follow a similar process to that described in Section
2.3. In the asymmetric case Northern consumption based on preferences (2) satisfies
cUPx (i) = cUPx =
1
pN
￿
pN
P
￿1−ε
EN (21)
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cOPx (i) = cOPx =
1
pS
￿
pS
P
￿1−ε
EN (22)
pN =
￿
ε
ε− 1
￿
wN = 1
α
wN = 1
α
pS (23)
and cUPx (i) denotes goods under-patent and cOPx (i) denotes goods out-of-patent. Price pN applies to North-
ern goods under-patent and pS applies to Northern goods out-of-patent.
The Northern expenditure and labor constraints satisfy7
pNζxnxc
UP
x (i) + pS(1− ζx(t))nxcOPx (i) = EN (24)
agx + ζxnxcUPx (i) + (1− ζx(t))nxcOPx (i) = LN (25)
Thus
EN = pN
￿
LN − agx − (1− ζx)nxcOPx
￿
+ pS(1− ζx)nxcOPx
= pN (LN − agx)− pN (1− ζx)nxcOPx
￿1
ε
￿
= pN (LN − agx)−
￿
pN
pS
￿
pS(1− ζx)nxcOPx
￿1
ε
￿
= pN (LN − agx)− ( 1
ε− 1)γxE
N
or
EN =
￿
ε− 1
ε− 1 + γx
￿
pN (LN − agx) (26)
where γx is defined as the value of Northern labor devoted to producing out-of-patent goods as a share of
7Which x goods are produced in the South depends on the amount of trade. If 1 − ζx(t) denotes the out-of-patent
range of x-goods imported by the North from the South can be distinguished from those the North produces at home:￿￿
1− ζ¯ (t)
￿
nx (0)
￿
cOPx +
￿
(1− ζ (t))nx (t)−
￿
1− ζ¯ (t)
￿
nx (0)
￿
cOPx = (1− ζx (t))nx (t) cOPx where the range of goods pro-
duced by the South is not greater than the out-of-patent range of goods,
￿
1− ζ¯ (t)
￿
≤ (1− ζx (t)), and
￿￿
1− ζ¯ (t)
￿
nx (0)
￿
cOPx
represents goods produced in the South. The second term represents goods produced in the North.
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Northern expenditure,8
γx =
(1− ζx)nxpScOPx
EN
= (1− ζx)nx(p
S)1−ε
(1− ζx)nx(pS)1−ε + ζxnx(pN )1−ε
= 1− ζx
1− ζx + ζx
￿
pN
pS
￿1−ε (27)
Diﬀerentiating (26) gives
E˙N
EN
= − γ˙x
ε− 1 + γ +
p˙N
pN
− ag˙x
LN − agx . (28)
Using (11),
rN = ρ− γ˙x
ε− 1 + γx +
p˙N
pN
− ag˙x
LN − agx . (29)
Applying (10), v˙NvN =
w˙N
wN − g and w˙
N
wN =
p˙N
pN as in section 2.3 gives
rN = π
N
vN
+
￿
p˙N
pN
− gx
￿
−mx (30)
From πN = (1− α) pNcUPx , (9) and (26) we next get
πN
vN
= 1− α
α
￿ (ε− 1) (1− γx)
ε− (1− γx)
￿￿
LN
a
− gx
￿ 1
ζx
(31)
Combining (29)-(31) gives
g˙x =
￿
LN
a
− gx
￿￿
ρ+ gx +mx − (ε− 1)(1− γx)
ε− (1− γx)
￿1− α
α
￿￿
LN
a
− gx
￿ 1
ζx
− γ˙x
ε− (1− γx)
￿
. (32)
The law of motion for ζx is the same as obtained under the symmetric regime,
ζ˙x = gx − (gx +mx)ζx (33)
8The North exports out-of-patent y goods in exchange for a range of x goods from the South that are out-of-patent.
As noted however, any imported x goods could have produced in the North using labor devoted to producing the y goods
that paid for those imports. Since labor is the only production cost and wages between North and South are equalized,
(1− ζx (t))nx (t) pScOPx equals the value of labor devoted to producing out-of-patent goods in the North.
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0 ≤ gx < L
N
a
, 0 ≤ ζx ≤ 1
and using (27) the motion of γx is given by
γ˙x
1− γx = −
ζ˙x
ζx
￿
γx + α1−ε (1− γx)
￿
(34)
Equations (32)-(34) constitute the autonomous dynamic system applying to the asymmetric regime. Notice
that in the former regime of symmetric IPR enforcement, the North did not produce any out-of-patent goods;
i.e., γx = 0 for all t. Setting γx = 0 and replacing LNby LN/2 the autonomous system (32) and (33) reverts
to (18) and (19).
4.3 Southern Welfare
Having completed the preliminary work, we can now assess the eﬀects of the regime switch on the South’s
intertemporal welfare. This assessment assumes that both the North and South were initially in steady state
in the regime where IPR enforcement was symmetricmx = my = m and the economy-determined equilibrium
steady state innovation growth rate before the regime switch was g0. In the initial regime, the rate of
innovation gx(t) = gy(t) = g(t) and the fraction of unimitated (under-patent) products ζx(t) = ζy(t) = ζ(t)
were fixed at g0 and ζ0 = g0/(g0 +m), respectively. Given the initial condition nx (0) = ny (0), the numbers
of x-type and y-type products, nx(t) = ny(t), grew according to nx(0)eg0t = ny(0)eg0t at time t.
When the South drops its IPR enforcement at t = 0, the resulting eﬀects on the South’s welfare are
the same in the embargo case as in the no embargo case.9 The regime shifts to a new steady state where
gy(t) = 0 and ζy(t) = 0 for t ≥ 0. Prices are determined by domestic production. Using equation (14),
present value of the South’s per-capita utility (discounted from t = 0 to infinity) in the initial regime of
symmetric IPR enforcement is
US0 =
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log uS0 (t) dt
= 1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿
ny(0)eg0t
￿
dt+ 1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿
ζ0
￿
pS0
pN0
￿ε−1
+ (1− ζ0)
￿
dt (35)
and that in the new regime of asymmetric IPR enforcement is given by
9This is because the innovation of y-goods ceases in either case and trade is welfare-neutral for the South as explained earlier.
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US1 =
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log uS1 (t)dt =
1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log ny(0)dt (36)
Subtracting (35) from (36):
￿US = US1 − US0 = ￿SProduct−availability +￿STerms−of−trade (37)
with
￿SProduct−availability = −
g0
(ε− 1) ρ2 < 0
￿STerms−of−Trade = −
1
(ε− 1) ρ log
￿
ζ0
￿
pS0
pN0
￿ε−1
+ (1− ζ0)
￿
> 0
In welfare terms, the adverse product availability eﬀect harms the South, because Southern consumers lose
the opportunity to consume an otherwise growing range of products. The terms-of-trade eﬀect benefits the
South because Southern consumers can consume existing products at a lower price when y production is
relocated from the higher-cost North to lower-cost South.10 With respect to the flow of utility, it is clear
that the South gains in the short run from lesser IPR enforcement because the terms-of-trade gains outweigh
product-availability losses. However, as time passes, terms-of-trade gains will sooner or later be outweighed
by product-availability losses. In present value terms, therefore the South could gain or lose from halting
IPR protecting for Northern-produced goods.
Table 1 provides simulation results for￿US and its components￿SProduct−availibility and￿STerms−of−Trade.11
The results indicate that product-availability losses dominate. The South loses from its failure to provide
intellectual property rights protection. This outcome stands in stark contrast to Theorem 1 (For economies
that begin in steady state, the South gains from looser intellectual property rights.). The possibility of losses
to the South from weaker IPR protection constitutes a major finding of the present analysis. In the model of
Theorem 1 the goods consumed in the North and South were perfect substitutes. When Northern goods and
Southern goods are not perfect substitutes (we have examined here the polar case of zero substitutability)
and the South enforces a lower level of intellectual property rights than the North, Southern welfare losses
10￿STerms−of−Trade can be written 1(ε−1)ρ log
 ζ0￿ qS1qN1 ￿ε−1+(1−ζ0)
ζ0
￿
pS0
pN0
￿ε−1
+(1−ζ0)
 which shows it as the diﬀerences of two logs where
1 = q
S
1
qN1
>
pS0
pN0
represents the Southern terms-of-trade improvement.
11To simulate the model we linearize the dynamic system (32)-(34) around its steady state (g1, ζ1) corresponding to imitation
rate m close to m∗∗, the imitation rate that leaves g0 = g1 and ζ0 = ζ1. See Figure 2. Evaluating the linearized system
produces Table 1.
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Table 1: SOUTHERN WELFARE:
IPR Enforcement to No IPR Enforcement in South
Rate of Imitation, m Product Availability Gain Terms of Trade Gain Total Welfare Change
(ρ = .0025)
.90m∗∗ (= .0215) -4348.94 215.53 -4133.41
.95m∗∗(= .0227) -4350.41 208.48 -4141.92
m∗∗ (=.0239)
1.05 m∗∗ (=.0251) -4353.22 195.75 -4157.47
1.10 m∗∗ (=.0263) -4354.56 189.96 -4164.60
(ρ = .015)
.90m∗∗ (=.0182) -107.32 36.77 -70.54
.95m∗∗ (=.0192) -107.55 35.63 -71.92
m∗∗ (=.0202)
1.05m∗∗(=.0212) -108.00 33.56 -74.43
1.10 m∗∗ (=.0222) -108.21 32.62 -75.59
(ρ = .03)
.90m∗∗ (=.0145) -22.67 18.88 -3.79
.95m∗∗ (=.0154) -22.78 18.33 -4.45
m∗∗ (=.0162)
1.05 m∗∗ (=.0170) -22.99 17.33 -5.65
1.10 m∗∗ (=.0178) -23.09 16.88 -6.20
Notes: m∗∗ is the critical imitation rate at which the regime switch does not alter the initial steady-state equilibrium.
Other than m and ρ, the simulations use these parameter values: LN = 1, LS = 12, a = 3, ε = 3.
emerge.
The case where terms of trade gains dominate and the South gains from non-enforcement of IPR rights can
be seen by considering the limiting case wherem approaches 0+ . In this case ζ0 → 1, g0 → (1− α)
￿
LN
2a
￿
−αρ
and p
N
0
pS0
becomes infinitely large according to (13). With initial large adverse terms of trade, relocating
production to the South by failing to protect Northern intellectual property can yield tremendous terms-of-
trade gains that dominate in present value the future product availability losses.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Southern Welfare ): For economies that begin in steady state with symmetric IPR en-
forcement, dropping IPR enforcement in the South may lead to higher or lower Southern welfare. If the
initial rate of imitation is suﬃciently small (resp. large), Southern welfare is helped (resp. harmed).
4.4 Northern Welfare
The eﬀect of the regime switch on Northern welfare would appear at first glance to be less interesting than
Southern welfare because the North obviously suﬀers both a terms-of-trade loss and loses the Southern
market within which to sell its innovated y products. Both eﬀects work against Northern welfare, the latter
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Figure 2: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STEADY-STATE INNOVATION RATE AND IMITATION RATE
because a small market means less profit opportunity and incentive for innovation. If the North does not
impose an embargo on imports of newly copied x-goods, it also suﬀers the loss of its x-good innovation
sector.
On the other hand, taking resources out of y innovation means more available resources for potential
x type innovation when the viability of x innovation is protected by an embargo. Competing against the
x innovation sector for resources with the passage of time are Northern firms that competitively produce
products for zero economic profit instead of producing under-patent products as in the symmetric regime.
These take resources away from innovation activities and production of higher-profit under-patent goods.
Coupled with the North’s lost gains from trade, these cause the North to finance innovation from a potentially
lower standard of living. Whether the freeing of resources previously devoted to y innovation can lead to a
suﬃcient increase in x-innovation and future consumption that it generates welfare gains for the North is an
open question. We show in what follows that both alternatives are possible. The rate of imitation plays an
important role in determining which of the competing forces dominate and lead to a reduction or increase
in the pace of innovation and change in the present value of Northern welfare.
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Table 2: NORTHERN INNOVATION RATES:
Steady-State Innovation Growth Rates and Share of Products Under Patent Asymmetric Regime
Rate of
Imitation,
Symmetric Regime Asymmetric Regime Symmetric Regime % of
m Innovation
Growth Rate g0, %
Innovation
Growth Rate g1, %
Products
under Patent ζ0
Products
under Patent ζ1
(ρ = .0025)
.90m∗∗ (=.0215) 5.4361 5.9944 71.6260 73.5702
.95m∗∗ (=.0227) 5.4380 5.7173 70.5215 71.5519
m∗∗ (=.0239)
1.05 m∗∗(=.0251) 5.4415 5.1619 68.4130 67.2623
1.10 m∗∗(=.0263) 5.4432 4.8837 67.4060 64.9797
(ρ = .015)
.90m∗∗ (=.0182) 4.8297 5.4072 72.5832 74.7727
.95m∗∗ (=.0192) 4.8401 5.1301 71.5383 72.7080
m∗∗ (=.0202)
1.05 m∗∗(=.0212) 4.8601 4.5673 69.5445 68.2127
1.10 m∗∗(=.0222) 4.8696 4.2808 68.5925 65.7521
(ρ = .03)
.90m∗∗ (=.0145) 4.0823 4.7016 73.6619 76.3093
.95m∗∗ (=.0154) 4.1016 4.4158 72.6937 74.1337
m∗∗ (=.0162)
1.05m∗∗ (=.0170) 4.1385 3.8131 70.8480 69.1279
1.10m∗∗ (=.0178) 4.1562 3.4904 69.9673 66.1767
Notes: m∗∗ is the critical imitation rate at which the regime switch does not alter the initial steady-state equilibrium.
Other than m and ρ, the simulations use these parameter values: LN = 1, LS = 12, a = 3, ε = 3
4.4.1 Northern Welfare: Embargo Case
Inspection of the system steady states for equations (18)-(19) and equations (32)-(34) shows that x innovation
growth rates can be higher or lower in the regime of asymmetric IPR enforcement with embargo compared to
the symmetric regime. Figure 2 plots the relationship between the imitation rate and steady state innovation
growth for the two regimes of symmetric IPR enforcement and asymmetric enforcement with embargo. The
results are summarized in Table 2 for three choices of the subjective discount rate (.25%, 1.5%, and 3%
).12 As shown there, steady state innovation is higher in the asymmetric regime, g1 > g0 when the rate of
imitation is below m∗∗. When the rate of imitation is high, the steady state x innovation rate drops below
the corresponding rate of the symmetric regime. A higher innovation growth rate is associated with a higher
equilibrium share of products under patent, as shown in the two right hand columns of Table 2.
Returning to Figure 2, we see that a suﬃciently high imitation rate (in the case of ρ = .015, for example,
this rate is m ≥ m∗ = .0341) causes the x innovation rate to fall to zero after the South drops IPR
protection. When the Southern market was available, Northern innovation was sustainable, even in the face
of high imitation, because the combined market was large enough to provide the profits needed by innovators.
12The same procedure is used for Table 2 as was used to generate Table 1.
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When the market for innovated products is confined solely to the smaller North in this case, innovation is
not supportable. In the presence of high imitation rates therefore, we expect Northern welfare to drop after
the regime switch because the North experiences lower innovation and worsened terms of trade.
Using equation (14), present value of the North’s per-capita utility (discounted from t = 0 to infinity) in
the initial regime of symmetric IPR enforcement is
UN0 =
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log uNo (t)dt
= 1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿
nx(0)eg0 t
￿
dt+ 1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿
ζ0 + (1− ζ0)
￿
pN0
pS0
￿ε−1￿
dt
+
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿
1− 2ag0
LN
￿
dt (38)
where 2ag0LN is the share of labor devoted to innovation activities, a measure of savings in the economy.
log
￿
1− 2ag0LN
￿
therefore measures the logarithm of labor devoted to producing current consumption goods.
In the asymmetric regime, discounted present value of future welfare is ( see Appendix for details)
UN1 =
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log uN1 (t)dt
= 1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿
nx(0)egx(t)t
￿
dt
+ 1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿
ζx (t) + (1− ζx(t))
￿
pN1
pS1
￿ε−1￿
dt
+
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿
1− 2agx(t)
LN
￿
dt
+
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿
ε− 1
ε− 1 + γx(t)
￿
dt (39)
where gx(t), ζx(t), and γx(t) are time dependent, subject to system (32)-(34), and will converge to g1, ζ1, γ1
in steady state.13 Subtracting (38) from (39) yields
13According to (27), lim
t→∞
γx (t) = 1−ζ11−ζ1+ζ1aε−1 .
21
￿UN = UN1 − UN0
= ￿NProd.−availability +￿NTerms−of−trade +￿NMkt−power (40)
+￿NProd.−location +￿NSaving
where
￿NProd.−availability =
1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt (gx(t)− g0) tdt
￿NTerms−of−trade =
1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
ζ0 + (1− ζ0)
￿
pN1
pS1
￿ε−1
ζ0 + (1− ζ0)
￿
pN0
pS0
￿ε−1
 dt
￿NMkt−power =
1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
ζx(t) + (1− ζx(t))
￿
pN1
pS1
￿ε−1
ζ0 + (1− ζ0)
￿
pN1
pS1
￿ε−1
 dt
￿NProd.−location =
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿
ε− 1
ε− 1 + γx(t)
￿
dt
￿NSaving =
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿1− agx(t)/LN
1− 2ag0/LN
￿
dt
Inspection of each term reveals under what conditions it is positive or negative. The sign of the product
availability term is negative if gx(t) < g0. The term-of-trade term is always negative since pN1 /pS1 < pN0 /pS0
(see (7) and (20) ). It measures change in welfare due to the worsened terms-of-trade the North faces after the
regime switch with the same mix of goods under-patent and out-of-patent. The market power term, relating
to the fraction of goods monopolistically supplied, is negative if the share of Northern goods under patent
rises, ceteris paribus, ζx(t) > ζ0 because of the monopoly element. The production location term is uniformly
negative when the North produces some goods perfectly competitively (as is the case, γx(t) > 0) since it
represents a reduction in associated profits to those firms compared to monopolistic market structure. The
final savings term is negative if agx(t)/LN > 2ag0/LN . The explanation here is that when the share of labor
devoted to the innovation sector is greater after the regime switch than before, more current resources are
22
!"#$%& '( )*+,& -"+#%+. /0% 12203+4"02 5+4& +26 7*+%& 0/ )%06$84, 926&% )+4&24 "2 :,;..&4%"8
1)5 <2/0%8&.&24 5&#".&
!"#$"#%"#&" "#'
"#"(
"#!
"#!(
) *+"
ζ *+"
,
-
.
/
0
ζζ1
)
!"# $%&'()*+ ,)-./*) 0+ '() 1*/+20'0%+ '% 3)4 $')/56 $'/')
=*&2 4*& 70$4* 6%0>, 1)5 &2/0%8&.&24 +4 4".& ! ? @A 4*& %&#".& 4%+2,"4"02, 40 + 2&B ,4&+6; ,4+4& /0% 4*&
70$4*A B*&%& "!C!D ? #!C!D ? @ /0% ! ! @$ %" ? %# A +26 >%"8&, 0/ E08+EE; 802,$.&6 #006, &F$+E 60.&,4"8
>%06$84"02 80,4,G H*& 70$4*I, >&%J8+>"4+ $4"E"4; C6",80$24&6 /%0. ! ? @ 40 "2K2"4;D "2 4*& "2"4"+E %&#".& ",
&#! ?
! !
!
'"$% E0# (#! C!D)! ?
L
*" L
! !
!
'"$% E0#M+!C@D'&!%N)!
O
L
*" L
! !
!
'"$% E0#M#!C
,!
#
,!"
D'"" O CL" #!DN)!$ C'PD
+26 "2 4*& 2&B %&#".& ",
&#" ?
! !
!
'"$% E0# (#" C!D)! ?
L
*" L
! !
!
'"$% E0# +!C@D)!- C''D
7$Q4%+84"2# C'PD /%0. C''DA
R&# ? &#" " &#! ? R#)%06$84J+3+"E+Q"E"4; O R#H&%.,J0/J4%+6& C'SD
B*&%&
R#)%06$84J+3+"E+Q"E"4; ? "
"!
C*" LD.# / @
R#H&%.,J0/J4%+6& ? "
L
C*" LD. E0#M#!C
,!
#
,!"
D'"" O CL" #!DN 0 @-
L'
Figure 3: PHASE DIAGRAM
devoted to innovation than to production of current consumption goods. Increased saving activity therefore
diminishes current consumption.
With diﬀerent avenues of welfare influence operating we need to determine whether gx (t) is greater than
or less than g0. Figure 3 draws the phase diagram for the model of Table 2, showing the stable arms with
directional arrows.14 The locus ζ˙ = 0 is unchanged in the regime switch. Thus two outcomes are possible.
If the new steady state is such that g1 > g0 the regime switch causes g to jump to the stable arm as from
point b to c and travel northeast to the new steady state. At the same time, ζx(t) increases steadily to its
new value ζ1. Thus the regime switch causes both gx(t) and ζx(t) to be uniformly above their initial value.
If g1 < g0 the reverse is true; gx(t) takes an initial jump downward after the regime switch as from point
d to e. Thereafter, both gx(t) and ζx(t) decline uniformly to g1 and ζ1 respectively. The sign of each of
the components of Northern welfare can be determined based on the path of gx(t) and ζx(t). In no case,
however, are all terms of (40) the same sign. To see whether Northern welfare gains are possible we examine
the model of Figure 2 and Tables 2-3 in the neighborhood of the crossover point a.
Table 3 computes the components of Northern welfare change for the values of Table 2. As shown there,
Northern welfare can rise or fall. In each case the terms-of-trade component (column 2) shows welfare losses,
as expected. The less discounting of the future, the greater the present value of terms-trade losses is. The
product availability and market power terms lead to Northern welfare grains of losses according to whether
14Parameter values for the diagram in Figure 3 are: LN = 1, LS = 12, a = 3, ε = 3, α = 2/3, ρ = .015, m = .0202.
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Table 3: NORTHERN WELFARE:
Regime of Symmetric IPR Enforcement to No IPR Enforcement in South
(The North enforces a Section-337 type embargo)
Rate of
Imitation,
Product
Availability
Terms of
Trade
Market
Power
Location
of Prod.
Saving Total
Welfare
m Gain Gain Gain Gain Gain Change
ρ = .0025
.90m∗∗ (=.0215) 446.93 -231.17 -3.46 -80.85 78.73 210.17
.95m∗∗ (=.0227) 223.59 -229.05 -1.80 -84.87 82.77 -9.36
m∗∗ (=.0239)
1.05m∗∗(=.0251) -223.86 -224.57 1.76 -92.76 90.73 -448.70
1.10m∗∗(=.0263) -448.02 -222.60 4.04 -96.65 94.64 -668.59
ρ = .015
.90m∗∗ (=.0182) 13.14 -37.85 -0.51 -13.21 11.14 -27.30
.95m∗∗ (=.0192) 6.61 -37.54 -0.26 -13.84 11.80 -33.24
m∗∗ (=.0202)
1.05m∗∗(=.0212) -6.72 -36.91 0.28 -15.07 13.08 -45.34
1.10m∗∗(=.0222) -13.56 -36.59 0.59 -15.67 13.70 -51.53
ρ = .03
.90m∗∗ (=.0145) 3.77 -18.53 -0.22 -6.45 4.45 -16.98
.95m∗∗ (=.0154) 1.93 -18.40 -0.11 -6.74 4.76 -18.56
m∗∗ (=.0162)
1.05m∗∗(=.0170) -2.06 -18.13 0.12 -7.30 5.36 -22.01
1.10m∗∗(=.0178) -4.29 -17.99 0.24 -7.57 5.66 -23.95
Notes: m∗∗ is the critical imitation rate at which the regime switch does not alter the initial steady-state equilibrium.
Other than m and ρ, the simulations use these parameter values: LN = 1, LS = 12, a = 3, ε = 3
the new regime results in higher or lower product innovation, as described above.
In each of the cases shown, the North loses welfare overall due to loss of IPR protection in the South. The
single expectation is the first row of Table 3 where the subjective discount rate and the rate of imitation are
both low. In this case the route to gains – the savings eﬀect and the product availability eﬀect – is that the
new regime resulted in higher x innovation and at the same time released resources from the y innovation
sector so that greater resources were available for current consumption of x goods. The surprising possibility
that the North might actually gain in present value terms from the dynamic consequences of the loss of IPR
protection in the South is therefore demonstrated.
We next describe Northern welfare in the no embargo case before summarizing our findings.
4.4.2 Northern Welfare: No Embargo Case
As described above, in the absence of a Northern embargo equilibrium is characterized by no innovation of
x or y goods and all goods are produced under conditions of perfect competition:
qN1 = qS1 = pN1 = qS1 = wN1 = wS1 (41)
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gx = gy = g1 = ζx = ζy = ζ1 = 1− γx = 0 (42)
The components of Northern welfare change compared to the regime of symmetric IPR enforcement are
￿NProd.−availability =
1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt(g1 − g0)tdt
= −g0(ε− 1)ρ2 < 0
￿NTerms−of−trade =
1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
 ζ0 + (1− ζ0) (1)ε−1
ζ0 + (1− ζ0)
￿
pN0
pS0
￿ε−1
 dt
= −1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
log
￿
ζ0 + (1− ζ0)
￿
pN0
pS0
￿ε−1￿
< 0
￿NMkt−power =
1
ε− 1
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿
ζ1 + (1− ζ1) (1)ε−1
ζ0 + (1− ζ0) (1)ε−1
￿
dt
= 1
ρ
log
￿
ε− 1
ε
￿
< 0
￿NSaving =
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt log
￿ 1− ag1/LN
1− 2ag0/LN
￿
dt
= −1
ρ
log
￿
1− 2ag0/LN
￿
> 0
It follows that the North is worse oﬀ because of the failure to innovate new x products, its worsened
terms-of-trade, and the loss of monopoly profits from the shift in production location. Its only source of
gain is the saving term since resources leave the x and y innovation sectors for use in producing current
consumption. Table 4 confirms that Northern welfare is reduced in each of the cases examined, both in
comparison to the initial regime and in comparison to the regime where the North imposes an embargo on
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Table 4: NORTHERN WELFARE:
Regime of Symmetric IPR Enforcement to No IPR Enforcement in South
(The North does not enforce a Section-337 type embargo)
Rate of
Imitation,
Product
Availability
Terms of
Trade
Market
Power
Location
of Prod.
Saving Total
Welfare
m Gain Gain Gain Gain Gain Change
ρ = .0025
.90m** (=.0215) -4348.94 -291.89 0.0 -162.18 46.04 -4756.98
.95m** (=.0227) -4350.41 -291.79 0.0 -162.18 46.05 -4760.33
m** (=.0239)
1.05 m**
(=.0251)
-4353.22 -291.39 0.0 -162.18 46.08 -4760.63
1.10 m**
(=.0263)
4354.56 -290.95 0.0 -162.18 46.10 -4761.60
ρ = .015
.90m** (=.0182) -107.32 -47.68 0.0 -27.03 6.77 -175.26
.95m** (=.0192) -107.55 -47.69 0.0 -27.03 6.78 -175.49
m** (=.0202)
1.05 m**
(=.0212)
-108.00 -47.66 0.0 -27.03 6.81 -175.88
1.10 m**
(=.0222)
-108.21 -47.63 0.0 -27.03 6.83 -176.05
ρ = .03
.90m** (=.0145) -22.67 -23.27 0.0 -13.51 2.83 -56.63
.95m** (=.0154) -22.78 -23.29 0.0 -13.51 2.85 -56.74
m** (=.0162)
1.05 m**
(=.0170)
-22.99 -23.31 0.0 -13.51 2.88 -56.93
1.10 m**
(=.0178)
-23.09 -23.30 0.0 -13.51 2.89 -57.02
Notes: m∗∗ is the critical imitation rate at which the regime switch does not alter the initial steady-state
equilibrium. Other than m and ρ, the simulations use these parameter values: LN = 1, LS = 12, a = 3, ε = 3.
imports of newly-copied x goods from the South.
Expect in cases of extremely high subjective discounting of the future by the North,15 we expect an
embargo to be the higher welfare alternative for the North in response to Southern failure to enforce IPR.
We summarize our conclusion about Northern welfare in the embargo case in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Northern Welfare): For economies that begin in steady state with symmetric IPR enforce-
ment, dropping IPR enforcement in the South may lead to higher or lower Northern innovation and welfare.
15As ρ → ∞ the change in Northern welfare approaches zero, implying that the North is better oﬀ without an embargo in
cases where Table 2 shows overall welfare loss
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5 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION
The classic dilemma between protecting intellectual property rights to induce future innovation or allowing
fuller dissemination of technology to foment competition in production raises special questions when one
region, call this the North, innovates and another region, call this the South, purchases the innovated
product. Clearly the North and South have a common interest in selecting IPR enforcement that is not too
strict; both lose by virtue of the ineﬃciencies introduced by monopoly elements in competition. At issue is
whether there is interest in enforcing common intellectual property rights that are not too low. A positive
answer is significant because self-interest is a powerful motivating force in working toward international
cooperation.
This paper examined the welfare eﬀects of failure to enforce IPR in the South, starting from a regime
of symmetrical IPR enforcement by both North and South. We showed that failure to enforce intellectual
property rights by the South changes the direction of Northern innovation: Absence of Southern IPR rights
enforcement causes the North to innovate for Northern markets but not for the Southern market. We found
that the dynamic losses to the South from a smaller range of future goods can outweigh the terms-of-trade
and price-related gains from producing copied Northern goods at lower cost.
An important feature in this scenario is that Northern and Southern goods were not assumed to be
perfect substitutes. Relaxing the perfect substitutes assumption allowed for some Northern innovation to
be diﬀerentially directed toward Southern markets. Failure to provide Southern IPR would therefore hinder
the innovation process, the consequences of which could fall more heavily Southern consumers. In the
present model Northern and Southern goods have zero substitutability so the consequences were sharp:
Innovation of new Southern goods ceased without Southern IPR protection. Models with diﬀerent degrees
of substitutability between Northern and Southern goods, however, would also allow for the eﬀects of failure
to provide IPR to fall more heavily on one region or group of goods than another.
We also evaluated the eﬀect of Southern failure to enforce IPR on Northern welfare. The impact on
Northern welfare operated through five channels. Northern welfare was aﬀected by a diﬀerent rate of in-
novation of Northern goods, leading to diﬀerent product in the future. The degree to which the North’s
terms-of-trade worsened as a result of lower prices for goods that it had once sold to the South in the
symmetric regime as unimitated products also aﬀected its welfare. The range of goods which shifted from
monopoly to perfect competition in provision raised Northern welfare by eliminating monopoly ineﬃciencies.
On the production side, the production location eﬀect altered Northern welfare according to the lost profit
associated with resources that the North devoted to zero-profit industries compared to positive-profit indus-
tries previously . Finally, Northern welfare was helped by a saving eﬀect, meaning the releasing of resources
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to other Northern assignments that were previously devoted to innovating for the Southern market. Each
channel was identified with a term in the overall welfare change formula.
To protect its innovation sector the North responded to lack of Southern IPR protection by the conven-
tional trade law remedy of imposing an embargo on imports of goods that were under patent at the time
of the regime switch. We examined the case where the North did not impose an embargo, confirming that
Northern welfare is higher with embargo than without.
We expected that the combination of worsened terms-of-trade for the North and a smaller market for
innovated products would guarantee lower innovation rates and net welfare losses. The analysis surprised us
on both counts. Not only did we find that Northern innovation could be higher after the regime switch, but
the model showed that Northern welfare paradoxically might rise, due primarily to the beneficial eﬀects of
the saving gain and increased innovation of Northern products after the regime switch. In the usual case,
however, Northern welfare suﬀered due to Southern dropping of IPR protection.
What lessons can we draw? There appear to be at least two. First, asymmetry is a key aspect of the
innovation process. Failure to provide intellectual property rights may lead to consequences that fall more
heavily on one sector or country than another. That country can be North or South. While a model with
asymmetries is often more computationally intensive, we believe that its insights will ultimately prove critical
to a full understanding of the international ramifications of intellectual property rights enforcement. Second,
failure to provide IPR in the South appears to harm the North primarily through worsened terms-of-trade
and adverse eﬀects on its future innovation as intuition would suggest. However, the paradoxical case where
Northern welfare rises after the regime switch is possible. The paradox was explained in terms of the several
routes for welfare change examined here. Knowing better how to predict or rule out such a seemingly unusual
outcome is a topic for further investigation.
Appendix
A Derivation of the North’s intertemporal welfare (39) in the
asymmetric regime
From (26), the North’s per capita expenditure is given by
EN
LN
=
￿
ε− 1
ε− 1 + γx
￿
pN
￿
1− agx
LN
￿
(A.1)
As described in the text, in the asymmetric regime Northern and Southern firms have the same technology
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and costs for out-of-patent goods. Thus, without loss of generality, assume that Northern firms in the
asymmetric regime produce all out-of-patent products, equal in number to (1− ζx)nx. The price index (4)
in the text becomes
P =
￿ˆ (1−ζx)nx
0
￿
pS
￿1−ε
di+
ˆ nx
(1−ζx)nx
￿
pN
￿1−ε
di
￿ 1
1−ε
￿
((1− ζx)nx)
￿
pS
￿1−ε + ζxnx ￿pN￿1−ε￿ 11−ε (A.2)
where pS denotes the price of out-of-patent goods. Using (A.1) and (A.2), the logarithm of the North’s
per-capita utility flow is given by
log uN1 =
￿
log E
N
LN
￿
− (log P )
=
￿
log
￿
ε− 1
ε− 1 + γx
￿
+ log pN + log
￿
1− agx
LN
￿￿
− 11− ε
￿
log nx + (1− ε) log pN + log
￿
(1− ζx)
￿
pS
pN
￿1−ε
+ ζx
￿￿
= log
￿
ε− 1
ε− 1 + γx
￿
+ log
￿
1− agx
LN
￿
+ 1
ε− 1 log nx
+ 1
ε− 1 log
￿
(1− ζx)
￿
pS
pN
￿1−ε
+ ζx
￿
(A.3)
where nx grows at the rate gx of innovation. (A.3) yields equation (38) of the text.
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